Abstract: Analyzing the tendency of Christian believers to rationalize the religious experience of the face of the Other, I reveal through Levinas, how, in doing so, they paradoxically neglect to perceive God, who is love.
one can try to perceive ontologically, albeit always failing to.4 In other words, encountering the face of the Other allows the conception of being to become possible. For, it is in encountering something significantly Other than me which gives me the realization that I am being in the first place.5 Prior to this, I had no conception of non-being, but now, before the face of the Other who existed before I did, I am thrown back into my finitude.
When Levinas mentions the Other, he is not talking about some vague, general other who is just another thing to be experienced, but the singular, proximate other human being who is wholly not me. 6 The general other in French is autre, whereas the Other is autrui. As an Orthodox Jew, autrui would have had special significance for Levinas. It is the rendering for the Biblical 'neighbour'.7 Tied to the word 'neighbour' is a certain ethical responsibility I am called to account for, whenever it appears in the text. For example, in the Decalogue from the fourth to the tenth commandment, there is a certain ethical responsibility tied to how I should act towards my neighbour. Plus, while often overlooked, the latter part of the Decalogue is powerful in that it implies my unhiding proximity to my neighbour. In other words, I necessarily have an effect on her. Furthermore, there is no Decalogue for how the Other should treat me, hinting at what Levinas experienced in the asymmetrical relationship with the Other. In this, the Other is already on a pre-existing pedestal over me, the eternal command which pre-existed my being, holding the power to do with me as she wills. 8 Now, when encountering the Other, Levinas argues that it is specifically the face which imposes ethical responsibility: "In the face of the other man I am inescapably responsible and consequently the unique and chosen one."9 However, does Levinas suddenly reduce the face of the Other to its sheer plasticity? Is this not an objectification, a grasp, or a knowledge of the Other? Even in this, however, it is paramount not to fall into the trap of mind-body dualism, where the body is not the Other. The real question should be, why do I doubt that the face of the Other is anything less than my experience of the Other? Levinas not only uses the word 'face' because it is at the centre of my gaze when I experience the Other, but he makes painstakingly clear that he does not mean, by 'face', the extended facial composition of the Other.10 Levinas instead draws the word 'face' from its meaning in Hebrew, wherein face is panim which means 'presence'.11 So, above all, the face of the Other is the presence of the Other.
Therefore, since I am naturally self qua ego -the one who controls my surroundings by assimilating all unknowns into the known -my environment is broken by the face of the Other. I become immediately bewildered, as I meet the other human being, one who is independent from me and unable to be assimilated into my control.12 There are two choices I can now make upon this experience.13 I can remain unchanged in my self qua ego, seizing and assimilating everything into myself.14 Or I can allow this transcendent experience to transform my ego into a self qua responsibility, allowing myself to live up to the call of ethical responsibility which the Other infinitely demands from me.15 The call itself will never go away, for it is one, by virtue of it pre-existing being, that I cannot be without.16 Therefore, I can either become passive before it and let it transform me or actively repel it and remain in my tyrannical environment.
Why does Levinas call this experience transcendent? Does it mean that I am taken to another realm where reality in its fullness is found as in the Forms which Plato professes? This is not the case. Rather, I transcend, not the world, but my self qua ego, as I am surprised that I am not the centre of the universe.17
Levinas calls this experience 'substitution', wherein I feel completely beholden to the proximate Other, occupying her place. 18 Furthermore, Levinas describes this experience as an-archic.19 By an-archy, Levinas is not referring to any political activism for social upheaval. For, this form of anarchy still retains an order in its disorder. Instead, Levinas uses the term 'an-archic' to describe the forcible removal of the archē, the foundation of Western philosophy as the ego of being, in which philosophers attempted to place their ontology before the command of the Other which woke them up to ontology.20 Therefore, in displacing my self qua ego, in which I have founded my being as the starting point of philosophy, my perspective is flipped upside-down as the Other forces this transcendent experience upon me in which my self qua ego is immediately substituted by my self qua responsibility. This gives me a new perspective as to the ethical responsibility I have been called to before conceiving of it.
As my archē is swept away in this transcendent removal from my self qua ego, I experience guilt. It carries an immediacy which, figuratively speaking, throws me prostrate onto the ground in humility. It can be noticed especially when around someone who is especially vulnerable, whether it be the homeless, the sick, or the dying. For example, there is the experience of holding a newborn baby. Simply put, the person holding the infant experiences her own littleness before the Other, even though the infant is so much smaller than she. In that moment, she is experiencing an overwhelming call to live up to her self qua responsibility. She wants to meet the infinite demands of the baby, yet is never able to do so.
In this vulnerability, the infinite demands of the face of the Other gives me, from a Levinasian perspective, an experience of the trace of God in the Other. For God, although unable to be reduced to the term 'Infinite', is faintly experienced in this encounter with the face of the Other, when I experience the face of the Other who makes infinite demands of me. This ethical lens is the only way God can begin to make the faintest amount of sense to me, but even then, "This infinite always recedes from view, regardless of how much one attempts to approach it (DMT, 223)."21
It is precisely the vulnerability of the face of the Other which impinges on my experience and thrusts demands upon me, oftentimes without my full awareness. It awakens my mauvaise conscience, my guilty conscience, which, as Levinas says, "…fear[s] injustice more than death…", as in that moment it considers undergoing suffering to protect the Other.22 Just per the sheer nakedness of the face which presents itself before me, I experience the piercing of my own egoistic shell. As Levinas says, "The Other becomes my neighbour precisely through the way the face summons me, calls for me, begs for me, and in so doing recalls my responsibility, and calls me into question."23
In this experience, I am compelled to seize and eliminate any unpredictability in the wholly other-thanme.24 Despite my desire to retain control over myself and the world around me, the Other decenters me. The vulnerable nakedness of the face of the Other makes me accountable for my egoistic tendencies as I behold someone who is not me. Even though I might not disobey the primordial command to not murder the Other at this point, I may try to alleviate the feeling of shame in other violent ways. I may attempt to assimilate the Other into myself through rationalization, demonization, purposeful ignorance, dehumanization, fear of the unknown, problem-solving as a way to disavow the suffering that I otherwise might share in, and many other responses which leave me as an untransformed, yet affected nonetheless, self qua ego.25 No matter the violence, however, the face of the Other can never be actually reduced to its properties as an object.26 The face of the Other still unceasingly haunts me, dead or alive. The ethical power she holds exists outside space-time as I know it, not allowing me to domesticate it. An example of this can be found in the Passion of Jesus Christ in the Gospels. One of the Apostles, Peter, had betrayed his Lord three times. Only when the cock crowed did he become porous to the already suffering face of the one whom he hurt.27 In this experience, Peter felt an immediate rush of guilt. In other words, he was weighed down by a mauvaise conscience. Jesus, by his proximity, however far away at the time, pierced the egoistic shell of the guilty man who thought himself the centre of the universe.28 The Other was not held back by the bounds of space-time.
If the call of the Other is inescapable, how am I supposed to respond to her face? Even though ethics is first philosophy according to Levinas, I naturally possess an inclination to an active response in seizing and assimilating my surroundings. Then comes the paradoxical claim Levinas makes, that for transformation to take place, a passive response is required, in which I give myself over totally to the Other -trying my best to meet her infinite demands.29
What is this passive response? Again, it is important to look at the etymology of the word which Levinas purposefully uses. Passivity, in Greek, is pathos, which means 'to endure,' 'to suffer', and is the same root word for 'passion'. Therefore, the question arises: what calls me to endure or suffer a form of passion for the face of the Other? In the experience of the baby, it is her vulnerability that compels me to do everything I can for her, whether it is consoling her, changing her diaper, or caring for her when she is sick. As Peter experienced in the vulnerable Christ, I am called to respond with infinite passivity, even though I can never reach it. I am called to endure suffering and passion prompted by the immense weakness in Christ. The experience of Christ challenges my self qua ego, forcing transcendence upon me as I am called to an ethical responsibility corresponding to his infinite demands. It is important to note that Levinas would not suggest that Christ is God incarnate as is held as a core truth in Christianity, but he would acknowledge the profundity of the face of Christ as the Other who exemplifies the epitome of passivity, innocence, and vulnerability, causing me to consider replacing my self-centredness with Christ-centredness as Othercentredness.
However, this begs the question: how, in the Levinasian context, is the contemporary Christian able to experience the face of Christ on the cross, when the latter is no longer bodily present as he once was? Peter was able to experience the face of Christ in the flesh, allowing an obviously phenomenological case to apply to his situation. In other words, has the embodied face of Christ been able to break through the bonds of space-time?
Levinas opposed the idea of the face being reduced to its sheer plasticity.30 However, Levinas leaves no doubt regarding the necessary inextricability between my experience and the embodiment of the Other for an encounter.31 At the same time, he does claim that body has the ability to precede and transcend being, including space-time which is tied to it.32 As Nigel Zimmerman writes in regard to Levinas, "Indeed, without the flesh and blood of the self, the self would be unable to overcome the ontic priority, all too prevalently facing itself against Western philosophy."33 Applying this to Christ, as a result of his Incarnation, he has overcome being itself. Body, by its very nature, transcends space-time. As Zimmerman reflects, " [Levinas] locates in the body its own ontological regime, surpassing a nullifying objectification, in which the very nature of embodiment traverses the distance into the realm of the other."34 In other words, by virtue of Christ being hypostatically united to his manhood, he has been able to traverse the distance into the realm of the other.
Yet, Christ does not necessarily use his own bodily presence when one experiences him. Instead, he uses those who are Christlike, namely the vulnerable. Commenting on the Incarnation of Christ, Levinas remarks, "There is a magnificent meditation of Jean Paul II relative to Christianity, teaching us that God would be incarnated not solely in Christ, but through Christ in all men."35 This is an indication that, although Levinas adamantly denied the truth of the Christian Incarnation, he appreciated the Christian idea that God continues to live in the other human being, provided she allows him to abide in her skin.36 Furthermore, Emmanuel Falque notes, "How would Saul have recognized Christ on the road to Damascus if he was not, as the text says, "he whom you were persecuting" (Acts 22:7), and how would Saint Augustine have understood that he who was addressing him in the garden of Milan was the incarnate Word, if he had not recognized therein the voice of the God that his mother Monica did not "cease to beat into his ears" (Confessions VII)?"37 Summarizing Levinas, Falque points to the preferred channel God, who Christians believe Christ is, works through -the bodies of vulnerable humans.
From a Levinasian perspective, the face of Christ calls me to holiness. However, the way he defines holiness holds a different emphasis than the theologically Christian definition of it. Holiness in Christianity means growing in a share of the life of God. However, in the Hebrew, holiness is translated into kadosh meaning separate, which allows me to experience a trace of God. In encountering the Other, I also experience holiness in the separateness between the Other and myself as I encounter the one who is impossible to assimilate. Although separate, there is an inescapable force the Other holds over me, that of her command pre-existing my being which calls me to passivity.38 Genuine relationships require this separateness as I cannot love someone selflessly unless I protect their freedom to either love me back or not. For instance, if God were to force me to follow him, God would be assimilating me into him, making me unfree. Therefore, for Levinas, God, as the one who is utterly transcendent, is also the one who is utterly separate and only experienced through the other human being.39 This separation is not the same as isolation, for I remain called to substitute my self qua ego with my self qua responsibility, which would never happen if not for my neighbour.
Drawing this to the relationship between the believer and Christ, the ultimate Other in the Christian experience, I am reminded of the second letter from Paul to the Corinthians, where he exasperatedly claims, "Therefore I am content with weaknesses, insults, hardships, persecutions, and calamities for the sake of Christ; for whenever I am weak, then I am strong."40 Paul had just been stoned, rejected, and persecuted by the towns he had visited as he carried out what he believed to be the mission of Christ. Now, how could he claim to be strong when in the immediate experience of weakness? He is filled with strength when pouring out himself for the Other, even to the extent of great physical suffering in the undergoing of his passion. Is this just a matter of a positive attitude? Or is it something deeper, a transcendent experience in which he realizes that nothing he could ever do could meet the infinite demands of Christ for him?
I think the answer can be linked to the New Testament word, kenosis. The concept is an-archically counter-cultural for contemporary Western civilization. In the age of individualistic consumerism, where my self qua ego naturally focuses on self-preservation while, at the same time, desiring to appropriate the most objects into myself, kenosis flips this on its head. Kenosis is my radical self-emptying, pouring myself completely out for the sake of the Other. It is radically putting the Other before myself, forgetting myself and giving myself over to the infinite demands of the Other. However, it is not an active movement. Rather, it is a passive surrender, in my totality, to the Other. I cease to be a subject, an 'I', and become instead a 'me', an object to the Other.41 This is significant because I no longer am the one who is actively grasping the Other, rather, in my passivity, I am grasped by the Other.42 This is the passivity which makes Paul paradoxically strong, and it is the passivity which Levinas paradoxically claims gives me the truest sense of self amidst the infinite onslaught of commands from the Other.43 As Paul said, in his letter to the Philippians, "[Jesus,] who, though he was in the form of God, did not regard equality with God as something to be exploited, but emptied himself, taking the form of a slave, being born in human likeness. And being found in human form, he humbled himself and became obedient to the point of death-even death on a cross."44 This is kenosis, emptying himself, making himself nothing, allowing himself, although innocent, to be accused by the Other, so that the Other can abide in his skin. The Other can abide in his skin because he has become porous, allowing the Other to see what he sees, what he feels, what he experiences, in his utmost vulnerability. This kenosis, the hollowing out of the egoistic self, allows the Other to enter. So, kenosis acts as a necessary act for substitution to occur. There is no room in me for the Other if am filled with my egoistic self.
While there are abundant stories in the life of Christ which show this radical passivity, I believe there is no better example than in the face of the crucified Christ. In this, I see the Other in his most vulnerable state. I experience his face naked on the Cross, dripping in blood, with a crown of thorns, in excruciating pain, lacerations covering his body, and a wound from a lance piercing his heart. These make me feel guilty. However, I was not there, so why should I feel guilty? I think it is important to recall the first demand that the Other makes, from a time outside of time, for me not to kill her. As he is lifted on Mount Calvary, I become the object of his accusative gaze. A gaze that accuses me for taking part in his death, even though I had no being during that death. There is a sense of remorse when I experience an image of the crucified Christ, because his face, although medically dead, thrusts an avalanche of responsibility over me. It feels like a wave which pours over me, drowns me, and submerges me in the depth of an ocean of guilt in which I can either die and live or live and die. As I am dying, my self qua ego drives me to activity to save my life. Yet, this tensing of my muscles with all of my strength, ultimately sinks me deeper into the ocean of guilt. It is when I give up my life, acceding to the self qua responsibility through passivity, that I end up living. I am not unaffected by the guilt, but at peace with it. Levinas, in line with Jesus, would say that the correct response is to first die, which paradoxically gives me life. My self qua ego must be transformed into my self qua responsibility in order for me to live a life that is true: not fabricated, appropriated, or made consumable by my self qua ego. As Jesus said in the Gospel of Matthew, "For those who want to save their life will lose it, and those who lose their life for my sake will find it."45 Some may argue whether it has to be this way. For it seems that I can avoid being pierced in the first place. When I am in love with someone, the other seems to substitute my ego in a positive way with responsibility for her. It does not feel traumatic in the way Levinas describes. However, Levinas argues that love, the true love that is more than a whim, must be tinged with pain.46 For the more time I spend around someone I love, the more opportunities there are for me to break away from my own narcissistic view. It is not love if I have been around the Other in anticipation of receiving something. To give myself totally over to the Other person without expecting anything in return, with the sure conviction that I am still not giving enough, is the passive response, the kenosis, and the example of sacrificial love which Levinas wants to expose. This is the love that cannot be forced into a logical formula, for that would be violence to love.
Jesus exemplified kenosis before his passion, his ultimate passivity, in the Garden of Gethsemane: "Then he withdrew from them about a stone's throw, knelt down, and prayed, "Father, if you are willing, remove this cup from me; yet, not my will but yours be done." Then an angel from heaven appeared to him and gave him strength. In his anguish he prayed more earnestly, and his sweat became like great drops of blood falling down on the ground."47 Here, it is important to notice that it is in the midst of his weakness that the angel gives him strength, and it does not alleviate his anguish. This reinforces the point that passivity is not escapism. The point of receiving strength in weakness is not that it makes me strong sometime later when I reflect on that experience. The point is that it makes me strong in the immediacy of that moment, by allowing me to live in reality. My self is actualized, when I forget myself.48 This is when Jesus is actually stronger than ever before. In his passivity to the infinite demands of the Other, he is emptying himself, sweating blood because he has nothing else to give. This is part and parcel of the transcendent experience of the face of the Other, in this case those who persecuted him then and I who persecute him now.
Then, Jesus calls me to follow his kenosis, to be responsible for my action which has already killed him. When beholding a Crucifix, I notice that the Other is not living. The Other is dead. Yet, I still experience a call. So, the question arises, how Jesus, who hangs on the Cross lifeless, still calls me. At that moment, the Other indeed is at his most vulnerable. Yet, as Levinas notes, the Other does not need ontological qualifications to break through my defences. She need not be alive. Ethics is first philosophy. So, with Jesus, even if the Resurrection did not happen, I am still called. The call of the Cross is a transcendent experience of substitution, in which I find myself suffering in the place of the Other. It is up to me, whether I will take up the cross of the Other and endure the passion she calls me to, even though I will never be able to meet the infinite demands of her face. This is the kenosis which eliminates the fake comfort of the artificial environment which my self qua ego produces, hiding me from my ethical responsibility.
The phenomenology of iconography, particularly the Crucifix, is central to the Christian religious experience. How is it that a disembodied artifact can have the power to call me out of myself? As an Orthodox Jew, Levinas took to heart the prohibition of the graven image. 49 There is a deep suspicion of visual art in his writing.50 However, Jean-Luc Marion, who is profoundly influenced by Levinas, develops a philosophy of art that discerns its own distinct forms of transcendence.51 Remarkably, Marion does so while retaining much of the spirit of Levinas's thinking. He notes that Christianity has also been suspicious of works of art throughout history but argues that there is a distinction between an icon and an idol.52 When I look upon an icon, I am faced with a gaze that questions my own gaze.53 According to Marion, it can pierce my shell, thus prompting a transcendent experience. 54 The experience of looking at the Crucifix confronts the subject with a choice to either suffer with the representation of reality or not. Hence, beholding this type of artwork is a transcendent experience, as I am thrown from my egoistic tendencies to bear responsibility for the Other. 55 Now it would be wrong if I were to become responsible for the plasticity of that icon, for that would turn the artwork into an idol, an object which reflects my self qua ego, which Marion and Levinas alike reject.56 Instead, I am called to become responsible for the Other who is bodily present as she confronts me through the artwork. 57 Falque remarks, "One can hear the voice of another hidden behind a door or on the telephone, but his body is always necessary, even when it is hidden."58 The icon is a sign that points to a stranger -one who is clouded in mystery yet real. Marion sums this thought up succinctly: "The icon proclaims itself a useless servant of a veneration that it does not touch, but before which it effaces itself to the point of transparency." 59 This also implies that the icon, as part of body, is able to approach a form of phenomenological givenness. Michael Purcell comments on Levinas's belief in saying, "'For even if all that which gives itself does not phenomenalise itself, all that which phenomenalises itself must first give itself -unfolding according to the fold of givenness'."60 In other words, if an icon is able to be experienced, it gives itself phenomenologically.
A danger of the self qua ego in the believer, is the tendency to rationalize God. It is a tendency to use my self qua ego to appropriate my environment, accounting for any unknowns.61 However, if God is Infinite, he is utterly inconceivable. The moment I think of God is the moment I assimilate God into myself, evidently not grasping He who is the utmost Other.62 In this, I believe Christians can be reminded of their dependent fragility by Levinas. While the core belief of Christianity, the possibility of a personal relationship with Christ, is irreconcilable with the Orthodox Judaism of Levinas, he can teach Christians an important lesson which we often forget -that Christ can never be fully grasped either. He remains a mystery in himself who reveals and conceals at the same time. This cannot be forgotten with the one Christians call their Lord. Only through passivity can I allow God to grasp me, through experience of the Other.63 Once I realize that God is ungraspable, my self qua ego will be humbled. Christians cannot love God unless they adopt this passive response, in which I give him the freedom to do with me as he wills.
Levinas reminds us that the religious experience happens in the inter-human drama on earth. The witness of those who experience a deeply personal relationship with God, while not paying much attention to those around them, holds no efficacy, for it does not affect them, transform them, replace their self qua ego with their self qua responsibility.64 Levinas reminds me that I am not a stoic: I am someone who is called to be preoccupied with the concerns of the Other, temporarily forgetting my own. In this passivity of kenosis to the infinite demands that the face of the Other makes, I protect the Levinasian definition of holiness in the Other and in myself.65 I protect the separateness, the non-violence, and the non-assimilation between myself and the Other.66 Through this, I experience a trace of God.67 As Jesus says in a parable in the Gospel of Matthew, "Truly I tell you, just as you did it to one of the least of these who are members of my family, you did it to me."68 For Levinas, the other human being is necessary in encountering the Infinite. 69 He was careful not to collapse the Divine into the human being, but to show the human being as the only way to faintly experience the Infinite. 70 According to the etymology Levinas uses (deriving religio from re-and ligare), he suggests that religion is the cement which can bind humanity together, while retaining separateness, in focussing on the significance of the self-Other relationship. 71 Gschwandtner comments: "…this displacement has happened not through a pure and anonymous appeal from who-knows-where, but through the concrete encounter with the other person confronting the complacent self-preoccupation of the subject and calling it to radical response to the suffering face of the neighbour."72 Religious doctrine, dogma, and rituals are important, but are not the goal of religion. They are there in order for me to better perform my ethical responsibilities by forming a disposition in me to respond without counting the cost. Yet, it all boils down to that religious experience with the Other which forces a response from me. The more vulnerable the Other, the more I am called out of myself, challenging me to readily respond with passivity to the ethical encounter.
Furthermore, Gschwandtner claims, "This utterly separate transcendence, however, although desired and desirable (as the ''good'' beyond being), can never be desired directly but only sends us again toward the other, the neighbor, whom we do not desire."73 Here, Levinas is calling me to serve those hated by society -the undesirable, the disenfranchised, the one who makes me feel uncomfortable. If I am genuinely searching for God, then I can find him in the Other whom my self qua ego tries to ignore.
A world with a focus on the religious experience of the self-Other would be a world in which I passively place the Other before myself, ready to sacrifice myself for the Other out of love, without asking for anything in return. That is the definition of love which Levinas carefully safeguards. As Christians, we claim that God is love. Therefore, let us begin to experience God through love -that love which can only penetrate me through the death of my self qua ego in relationship with the other human being. Only through this, will a glimpse of the Divine Other reveal himself to me.
